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A Review of Uganda’s Tax Treaties and Recommendations for Action 
 
Martin Hearson and Jalia Kangave 
 
 
Summary 
 
In June 2014, Uganda announced the temporary cessation of bilateral tax treaty 
negotiations, and a review of its policy towards such treaties. The main effect of tax treaties 
is to divide up the ‘rights’ to tax cross-border investment between the state parties, which 
reduces the possibility that businesses will incur double taxation; in doing so, it places 
significant curbs on the ability of capital-importing countries, such as Uganda, to tax foreign 
investors.  
 
Uganda’s review follows decisions by developing countries as diverse as Argentina, 
Mongolia, Rwanda and Zambia to cancel or renegotiate some of their historical tax treaties. 
These countries, together with some independent commentators, international and non-
governmental organisations, have questioned whether the benefits of tax treaties for 
developing countries outweigh their costs. In Uganda, as elsewhere, tax treaties have always 
been surrounded by an investment promotion discourse in political debate, yet there is little 
convincing evidence that they have had a positive effect on investment flows into low-income 
countries. In contrast, there are some clear aspects of Uganda’s treaties, such as definitions 
of ‘permanent establishment’ and rules concerning the taxation of capital gains, which cost 
Uganda significant revenue and are vulnerable to abusive tax planning. A key problem is that 
Uganda’s negotiating position has been based on the UN model treaty, which embodies a 
compromise position, rather than an ideal one to be horse-traded during negotiations. The 
recent East African Community (EAC) and Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA) model treaties also represent compromise positions.  
 
This paper uses a comparative analysis of treaties signed by Uganda and other neighbouring 
countries, combined with interviews conducted with government officials and private sector 
tax advisers, to assess whether Uganda’s network of tax treaties is fit for purpose, and to 
recommend how it could be improved through the policy review. 
 
Keywords: capital gains tax; corporation tax; double taxation agreement; sub-Saharan 
Africa; tax treaty; treaty shopping; Uganda; withholding tax. 
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6 
Introduction 
 
At the beginning of 2014, there were approximately 300 bilateral tax treaties in force in sub-
Saharan African countries. Commonly framed as investment promotion tools, tax treaties are 
agreements through which state parties voluntarily agree to restrictions on their ability to tax 
economic activity that spans both countries. In particular, they prevent capital-importing 
countries from taxing inward investment in certain circumstances: for example, if the 
investor’s physical presence does not meet a certain threshold (known as permanent 
establishment), or if the income is of an excluded type, such as capital gains from sales of 
shares, or profits from shipping operations. Tax treaties also specify the rates at which 
capital-importing countries can levy withholding taxes on payments made to companies in 
the treaty partner, in particular on dividends, interest, royalties and technical service fees. All 
these provisions of tax treaties override domestic law in the capital-importing country, not just 
at the date of signature, but as long as the treaty remains in force. Because they are net 
capital importers in the case of most tax treaties they sign, developing countries usually bear 
most of these costs when they conclude tax treaties. 
 
The original logic behind these restrictions was that they removed onerous double taxation 
on cross-border investors, which resulted from the two countries’ competing claims to taxing 
their income, and depressed the level of investment. The question of whether or not the 
sacrifices made by developing countries when they sign tax treaties are justified by the 
benefits that they receive from any inward investment that might result, has been debated for 
as long as they have negotiated tax treaties (see, e.g. Irish 1974). There are two main 
concerns: the deliberate tax cost resulting from the restrictions on the developing country’s 
taxing rights, and the unintended tax cost resulting from the abuse of certain tax treaties in 
aggressive tax planning schemes.1 
 
The latter concern has come to the fore in recent years as policymakers, campaigners and 
international organisations have focused attention on tax planning by multinational 
companies. SOMO, a Dutch NGO, has argued that ‘treaty shopping’, which takes advantage 
of developing countries’ treaties with the Netherlands, costs them significant revenue 
(McGauran 2013; Weyzig and van Dijk 2007). The IMF (2014a: 24) states that, for the same 
reason, developing countries ‘would be well-advised to sign treaties only with considerable 
caution’. As part of its work to address treaty abuse, the OECD (2014a: 102) has produced 
guidance to ‘make it easier for countries to justify their decisions not to enter into tax treaties 
with certain low or no-tax jurisdictions’. In Uganda, two local NGOs, SEATINI and ActionAid 
Uganda, have argued that the country’s tax treaty network ‘is one of the mechanisms used 
by companies to avoid paying taxes, leading to illicit financial flows and tax losses for 
Uganda’ (SEATINI and ActionAid Uganda 2014). 
 
This debate has also translated into changes to tax treaty networks. South Africa and 
Rwanda have successfully renegotiated their agreements with Mauritius. Argentina and 
Mongolia have cancelled or renegotiated several agreements with European countries. 
Zambia has renegotiated its treaties with Ireland and the Netherlands, and Malawi with the 
latter. Perhaps in response to the international debate and the threat of further cancellations, 
the Netherlands and Ireland have both also begun a process of review of their tax treaties 
with developing countries (Irish Ministry of Finance 2014; Netherlands Ministry of Finance 
2013). 
 
                                                     
1  Both areas are also discussed at length in United Nations (2003, 2013, 2014). 
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In this context, Uganda’s Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development 
(MoFPED) has announced a review of its tax treaty network.2 MoFPED officials state that the 
review is motivated by a number of concerns. The lack of a politically derived policy to 
underpin negotiations is one. ‘When I go to negotiate, all I have is my own judgement’, 
according to one negotiator. ‘We thought that cabinet should express itself’.3 Officials are 
also concerned that Uganda’s tax treaties prevent it from taxing professionals providing 
technical services to its relatively young oil industry, and are questioning whether their as yet 
unratified treaty with China, which notoriously drives a hard bargain with developing 
countries (Li 2012), would curb Uganda’s taxing rights too much. 
 
With nine treaties in force, and several more pending ratification, Uganda can be described 
as a typical case. The median number of bilateral tax treaties signed by sub-Saharan 
countries is just four, but that rises to nine for former British colonies.4 For Uganda, as for the 
region, the largest share of these treaties is with Western Europe, although a growing 
number are being concluded between sub-Saharan countries, and with middle-income 
countries. A review of Uganda’s treaties may therefore be instructive for many other 
countries in the region. As Uganda is a member of the EAC and COMESA, both of which 
have model tax treaties, the review could also identify areas in which these models could be 
strengthened to serve as more effective opening positions in negotiations. 
 
The review presents an opportunity for Uganda to formulate a clear, evidence-based 
approach to tax treaties, beginning by asking questions that African countries seem rarely to 
have posed – or else to which they have forgotten the answers. What effect do Uganda’s tax 
treaties have on investment flows and tax revenue? What are the costs and benefits of tax 
treaties with particular partners and containing particular provisions? How many taxing rights 
is it worth giving up in order to reach agreement with a potential treaty partner? What would 
be the consequence of cancelling a tax treaty? Above all, why does Uganda have tax 
treaties? 
 
After a brief review of the general literature in Section 1, this paper evaluates Uganda’s treaty 
network in four sections. Section 2 examines the development of Uganda’s treaty network to 
date, using historical records, interviews and legal analysis to conclude that no compelling 
rationale has been articulated that justifies the fiscal costs in 2015. Section 3 examines those 
fiscal costs in more detail, comparing Uganda’s treaties to the UN model tax treaty, which 
officials cite as Uganda’s negotiating position, and examining how the treaties are open to 
abuse. In section 4, the model treaties to which Uganda is a party are examined, to illustrate 
that renegotiations are unlikely to generate significant improvements if a business-as-usual 
approach is maintained. Section 5 broadens the analysis to take into account domestic law 
and other legal instruments that interact with tax treaties. The paper concludes in Section 6 
with a set of recommendations. 
  
                                                     
2  Originally reported in the Ugandan press (Ladu 2014), government interviewees confirmed that the review was 
underway. 
3  Interview with Finance Ministry officials, Kampala, September 2014. 
4  Figures calculated by the authors based on IBFD (2016). 
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1  Tax treaties: a brief survey of the literature 
 
Bilateral tax treaties are the fundamental building blocks of the international tax regime – 
emerging from the work of the League of Nations in the first half of the 20th century, in 
response to concerns raised by the International Chambers of Commerce that conflicting 
claims by different countries to tax the same income earned by multinationals was leading to 
double taxation, which increased the cost of investing overseas (Picciotto 1992). The core 
settlement embodied in tax treaties has changed very little since the League of Nations’ 
model treaty was first published in 1928 (Avi-Yonah 2007): capital-importing countries accept 
curbs on their ability to tax investors from the treaty partner, and in return the treaty partner 
bears the cost of relieving any double taxation that its outward investors incur. 
 
Tax treaties give capital-importing countries the primary right to tax active or earned income, 
the profit from activities in which the recipient of the income plays an active role, such as if it 
has a branch in the other country. The capital-importing country may tax a foreign investor’s 
active business income originating within its borders, but only when the investor’s physical 
presence passes a certain threshold, known as a permanent establishment. In the absence 
of a treaty, the capital-importing country would be able to levy a tax on any income earned 
within its borders, regardless of the type or extent of a company’s or person’s presence, so 
long as it is able to enforce the tax. 
 
On the other hand, they give capital-exporting countries the primary right to tax passive or 
unearned income from activities in which the foreign investor is not actively involved, such as 
royalties for the use of intellectual property that it owns. Tax treaties do allow the capital-
importing country to levy a withholding tax (WHT) on some of these passive income flows, 
but they set a maximum tax rate that is usually lower than the rate in domestic law, and 
which applies regardless of changes to the statutory rates for as long as the treaty is in force. 
 
While the individual thresholds and other modalities must be negotiated on a bilateral basis, 
the structure of the international models means that whenever a treaty is concluded between 
two countries with asymmetrical flows of people and investment, as between a developing 
country and a developed country, the treaty will shift the balance of taxing rights away from 
the capital importer and towards the capital exporter. It is argued that the former will benefit 
from tax treaties where the welfare gains from increased inward investment outweigh the 
fiscal costs (Becker and Fuest 2012; Rixen and Schwarz 2009). 
 
This basic argument comes under attack from two directions. A long tradition of critical legal 
scholarship argues that it is a myth, because capital-exporting countries already relieve the 
bulk of any double taxation unilaterally: their tax systems give outward investors a credit for 
taxes paid overseas, or exempt foreign-source income from taxation altogether. In that case, 
it is argued, tax treaties merely shift the burden of double taxation relief away from the capital 
exporter, who bears it in the absence of a tax treaty, and onto the capital importer (Avi-Yonah 
2009; Dagan 2000; Thuronyi 2010). This attack is partly countered by pointing to the broader 
list of functions of tax treaties, including mopping up any outstanding double taxation that is 
not resolved unilaterally, guaranteeing more stable and predictable tax treatment for 
investors, and reducing what might be regarded as high WHT rates (Jones 1999; Pickering 
2013; Self 2014). It is also argued that even if the costs outweigh the benefits in a bilateral 
setting, a country with more treaties may attract more investment due to tax competition with 
others (Baistrocchi 2008; Barthel and Neumayer 2012). 
 
The second attack is perhaps more difficult to surmount. The evidence that tax treaties have 
a positive effect on investment flows into developing countries is far from clear. Until 2009, 
studies found a mixed effect – positive, neutral or even negative – but no positive effects for 
developing countries (Sauvant and Sachs 2009). Since then, some research has found 
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evidence of a positive association by using more comprehensive bilateral investment data 
(Barthel et al. 2009; Lejour 2014), or microdata drawn from databases of individual 
companies’ financial structures (Blonigen et al. 2014; Davies et al. 2009; Egger and Merlo 
2011). Even these studies fall far short of clear evidence, due to several limitations. First, 
these datasets tend to have poor coverage of developing countries, especially in the case of 
microdata: of the three microdata studies, only Davies et al. use a dataset with sufficient 
coverage of sub-Saharan Africa to be able to draw any conclusions. Secondly, investments 
commonly make use of treaty shopping, as shown in the case of the Netherlands by Weyzig 
(2012). Thirdly, treaties may follow, rather than provoke, an influx of investment, and both 
decision-making processes can have significant lag times, creating endogeneity. Finally, 
there may be competition effects in the developing country market, because a tax treaty may 
increase investment from a treaty country by allowing them to make greater profits than other 
firms, rather than creating additional investment. 
 
These legal and economic questions may be resolved through qualitative evidence, 
especially from in-depth case studies that allow for the identification of particular issues in the 
interaction of treaty partners’ tax systems, and for an examination of the volume and nature 
of investment flows between treaty partners. Furthermore, they allow for the inclusion of 
political variables. There is already evidence from Ghana (Christians 2005), Colombia 
(Quinones Cruz 2012) and Uganda (Aukonobera 2012; Kangave 2009) that tax treaty 
networks may not always be the product of rational negotiation founded on a strategy of 
investment promotion combined with revenue maximisation. This builds on similar claims 
made in the literature on bilateral investment treaties (Jandhyala et al. 2011; Poulsen 2014; 
Tobin and Rose-Ackerman 2011; Yackee 2005). 
 
The remainder of this paper presents just such a study. It is based primarily on interviews 
with government officials and private sector tax advisers conducted in Kampala in September 
2014, using a snowball sampling method. These are supplemented by documentary 
evidence from Uganda’s parliamentary record (Hansard), court judgements and other official 
documents, as well as analysis of treaty texts and domestic laws, and data on investment 
flows.  
 
 
2  Unconvincing explanations for the 
development of Uganda’s tax treaty network 
 
This section critically examines the explanations given by various stakeholders for Uganda’s 
tax treaties. One surprising outcome from our interviews is that hardly anyone familiar with 
Uganda’s tax treaties, whether in the private sector or in government, or even at the Uganda 
Investment Authority (UIA), believes that tax treaties have much effect on the amount of 
inward investment into the country. Despite this, most of the reasons offered up for tax 
treaties in Uganda still relate to investment promotion. Here we critically examine each in 
turn. 
 
2.1 Investment promotion and ‘tax sparing’ 
 
Aside from its 1968 treaty with Zambia, independent Uganda did not successfully conclude a 
tax treaty until 1992, when it signed with the UK. But it did negotiate before that time. For 
example, drafts were exchanged with the UK in the 1970s. It is unclear from British 
government records why these negotiations failed, but Uganda’s demand for a 40 per cent 
withholding tax on royalties, consistent with its domestic legislation, was clearly an obstacle.5 
                                                     
5  Correspondence from archived Inland Revenue file IR 40/17815. 
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Talks with the UK were also revived in the early 1980s, but it appears that it was not until the 
start of the 1990s that Uganda decided it was willing to make the sacrifices demanded by the 
UK in order to obtain a tax treaty.6 This change of heart coincided with reforms to create a 
more attractive environment for investors, many of which were embodied in the 1991 
Investment Code Act. 
 
The role played by tax treaties in this new investment framework was set out by Uganda’s 
Minister for Finance, Planning and Economic Development in 1993, announcing that the 
government would ‘embark on negotiating double taxation agreements with identified major 
trading partners’.7 As the Minister explained, the purpose of the treaties was to ‘ensure that 
the effectiveness of current incentives is not eroded by the absence of complementary tax 
credits’ because ‘in the absence of any complementary tax holidays with the home countries 
of foreign investors, the revenue foregone by reducing a company’s tax liability in Uganda 
represents a revenue gain by the Ministry of Finance in the home country’.8 The reasoning 
was that by including tax sparing provisions in a treaty, the treaty partner would agree to 
allow a credit for taxes due but foregone by Uganda due to investment incentives, thus 
ensuring that the benefit from the tax incentives accrued to the multinational investors at 
whom they were targeted. To underline the link with investment incentives, in the early 1990s 
the UIA also participated in treaty negotiations.9  
 
It took some time for the negotiating programme announced in 1993 to come to fruition, but 
three of Uganda’s subsequent tax treaties did include such tax sparing provisions: South 
Africa (1997), Italy (2000) and Mauritius (2003).10 After 1993, however, two other factors 
combined to undermine this rationale for treaty negotiation. First, in 1998, the OECD 
published Tax Sparing: a Reconsideration, which highlighted the potential negative impacts 
of tax sparing arrangements in tax treaties, in particular that they could potentially be abused, 
and that they created an incentive to repatriate profits quickly rather than reinvest them in a 
country (OECD 1998). This OECD report on its own did not halt the spread of tax sparing 
provisions, although it did suggest some best practice in the area. 
 
A second development was the spread of territorial tax systems throughout the OECD 
countries, under which a capital-exporting country exempts the foreign-source income of its 
outward investors from further taxation (PWC 2013). Under a territorial system, overseas 
investors automatically keep the gains from any tax concessions in the host country, whether 
or not a tax treaty is in place. Italy was already operating an exemption system at the time 
the treaty with Uganda was signed, and both South Africa and the UK now also exempt 
foreign-source dividends from direct investments from further taxation. 
 
2.2 Relieving double taxation 
 
Although their negotiated content indicates that tax sparing ceased to be Uganda’s main 
justification for tax treaties, it continued to sign them – with Norway (1999), Denmark (2000), 
the Netherlands (2004), India (2004) and Belgium (2007). A treaty with China was concluded 
in 2012, but has not yet been ratified. According to statements made in budget speeches, 
Uganda has also negotiated with Egypt, the Seychelles, Sudan, Turkey and the United Arab 
Emirates.11 
                                                     
6  Interview with Finance Ministry official, Kampala, September 2014. 
7  Mr. J. Mayanja Nkangi, quoted in Hansard, 25.6.93. 
8  Ibid. 
9  Interview with UIA official, Kampala, September 2014. 
10  Mauritius levies corporation tax at 15% on overseas income, but most investors in Uganda from Mauritius use the 
Global Business Company (GBC) form that attracts a rate of only 3%, making the benefits of sparing largely irrelevant. 
Because the GBC rate is effectively a tax incentive reducing the rate by 12 percentage points, it is possible that 
Ugandans can use Mauritius for ‘round tripping’, to avail themselves of the tax sparing clause. 
11  Budget speeches, Hansard 10 June 2004, 12 June 2008, 19 September 2013. 
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The government’s rationale for these treaties, set out by successive finance ministers when 
laying the treaties before parliament, has changed since 1992. According to Mr G. Ssendula 
in 2001, it was now ‘to protect taxpayers against double taxation, and to ensure that the tax 
system does not discourage direct foreign investment’; Dr Ezra Suruma concurred in 2006, 
that ‘the purpose of this agreement is to reduce tax impediments to cross-border trade and 
investment and assisting tax administration in information sharing’.12 
 
The difficulty with this view is that there are very few instances in which potential double 
taxation on investors in Uganda in the absence of these treaties can really be identified. All 
Uganda’s treaty partners take unilateral steps to relieve double taxation: the European 
countries all treat foreign-source dividends from direct investments as tax-exempt, as does 
South Africa; India, China and Mauritius provide a tax credit. Australian investors, by far the 
biggest non-treaty bloc according to Uganda’s investment statistics, seem to have had no 
concerns about tax when investing in Uganda, which may be because that country also 
exempts foreign source dividends.13 
 
Another argument often touted is that investor confidence is boosted by inclusion of the 
mutual agreement procedure (MAP) in Uganda’s tax treaties, which provides a procedure for 
resolution of claims of double taxation. However, it is also a good indicator of post-treaty 
complaints of double taxation. Revenue officials indicate that, after twenty-two years, Uganda 
has yet to enter into a MAP.14 A potential new case with the UK cited by Uganda Revenue 
Authority (URA) officials does not seem to concern double taxation, but is about which of two 
options provided in that treaty’s management fees article should be used. 
 
This is not to say that potential double taxation issues don’t exist. Kenya, with which Uganda 
does not have a treaty,15 does not give a credit for taxes paid overseas unless a tax treaty is 
in place. Instead, it allows Kenyan companies to deduct foreign taxes paid as an expense, 
which arguably entails some double taxation. Differences in definition or interpretation can 
also create double taxation in some instances: for example, where a fee paid to a company 
in one country for providing a service to a company in the other is regarded by both countries 
as originating within their borders. From Uganda’s perspective, it is unlikely (but not 
impossible) that this alone is sufficient reason for a treaty.  
 
In any event, the trite rationale that ‘treaties relieve double taxation, which attracts 
investment’, which still dominates discussion of tax treaties in Uganda, simply does not hold 
in the case of Uganda’s existing treaties. While in the absence of tax treaties there would no 
doubt be some investors who would be inconvenienced by some double taxation, it cannot 
be assumed that, in the absence of a treaty, a definite flow of investments would be choked 
off due to significant double taxation.  
 
2.3 Treaties as tax incentives 
 
There may be no major double taxation problem, but tax treaties may still attract investment 
into Uganda because of their effect on single taxation. This is because many of Uganda’s 
major investment partners exempt foreign income from taxation altogether. Hence, the lower 
withholding taxes and other restrictions on source taxation in Uganda’s tax treaties effectively 
act as tax incentives, lowering the overall cost for firms from these countries of investment in 
Uganda. 
                                                     
12  Budget speeches, Hansard 14 June 2001 and 15 June 2006. 
13  Although Uganda is not a substantial outward investor itself, it also relieves double taxation for Ugandan residents 
through a credit for taxes paid abroad. 
14  Interview with URA officials, Kampala, September 2014. 
15  Kenya and Uganda are both signatories to the EAC’s multilateral tax treaty, which has yet to be ratified by all member 
states. 
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Although this is no doubt positive for investors, there was a startling consensus across the 
stakeholders we interviewed that tax treaties were not a primary consideration for investors 
in deciding whether or not to invest in Uganda. A MoFPED official, despite the statements 
made by past finance ministers, stated boldly that ‘nobody comes to invest because you 
have a tax treaty. When you see the rationale to attract investment, it sounds laudable. But 
when you look at the evidence, it’s not the case’.16 According to an accountant in a tax 
advisory firm, ‘it is a secondary factor you take into account in terms of structuring’.17 A tax 
lawyer agreed: 
 
It would seem to me that tax is a secondary consideration. From our 
experience we have seen investors are looking to the economic drivers: 
business-based, rather than tax-based. A business will say ‘now we have 
decided where we are going to work, let’s get a tax expert to structure it’.18 
 
Unlike other developing countries, promotional literature from Uganda’s Investment Authority 
does not mention its network of tax treaties.19 An official there told us that investors are not 
interested in tax treaties: ‘to most of them it is not an important thing’.20 Indeed, tax treaties 
are not mentioned anywhere in a comprehensive survey of investors conducted by the UIA 
and Uganda’s National Bureau of Statistics.21 Among economic and financial factors 
affecting business, more than half of those surveyed said corporate tax had a low or no 
effect; only 15 per cent said it had a significant negative effect, which was second to bottom 
among the thirteen factors listed.22 
 
Uganda’s investment statistics, presented in Table 1, shed some further light on this. Inward 
foreign direct investment (FDI) stocks reported by Uganda are dominated by $3.7 billion from 
the Netherlands, but the Netherlands (whose data on outward investments exclude special 
purpose vehicles used in treaty shopping) reports only $179 million of FDI in Uganda. This 
suggests that 95 per cent of investment coming into Uganda from the Netherlands originates 
elsewhere. Investment from Mauritius into Uganda, at $381 million, does not appear to be as 
large as one might expect, given the talk of Mauritius in Kampala tax circles. But the fact that 
it exceeds investment from both South Africa and Kenya is notable. ‘Most of the companies 
investing in Africa have been setting up through a hub in Mauritius’, a tax adviser stated.23 
URA officials concurred, with one asserting that ‘there is a lot of treaty shopping. A lot of 
companies trading in Uganda have their HQs in Mauritius’.24  
 
The second biggest source of investments, also much bigger than any others, is Australia, 
which has no treaty with Uganda. New investment in Uganda’s oil industry has come from 
the French company Total and the Chinese National Offshore Oil Corporation, neither based 
in countries that have tax treaties with Uganda.  
 
  
                                                     
16  Interview with Finance Ministry official, Kampala, September 2014. 
17  Interview with tax advisers, Kampala, September 2014. 
18  Interview with tax adviser, Kampala, September 2014. 
19  See, for example, the list of ‘Reasons for investing in Uganda’ at <http://www.ugandainvest.go.ug/index.php/investment-
guide>.  
20  Interview with UIA official, Kampala, September 2014. 
21  Uganda Bureau of Statistics, Investor Survey Report 2012 (Kampala, 2012). 
22  Two tax advisers interviewed independently in London explained the role of tax factors in investment decisions slightly 
differently. According to them, businesses will calculate a risk-adjusted return on investment, including estimates of the 
likely tax cost as well as the risk of incurring higher or lower taxes than expected. In that case, tax does play a role in 
investors’ decision-making, but it is still secondary in comparison to business-related factors. It is more likely that tax 
would be the tie-breaker between two viable potential investments.  
23  Interview with tax advisers, Kampala, September 2014. 
24  Interview with URA officials, Kampala, September 2014. 
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Table 1 Investment stock in Uganda, 2012 
Home country Treaty? 
FDI equity 
stock in 
Uganda in 
2012 (US$) 
FDI debt 
stock in 
Uganda in 
2012 (US$) 
Netherlands Yes 3,729 198 
Australia No 1,736 412 
United Kingdom Yes 688 136 
Mauritius Yes 381 86 
Kenya No 312 105 
Switzerland No 99 14 
India Yes 99 9 
United States No 94 9 
Bermuda No 88 1 
South Africa Yes 64 45 
Norway Yes 28 1 
Denmark Yes 3 11 
Belgium Yes -26 28 
Source: IMF (2014).  
Note: data from some significant investors, notably China, is not available. 
 
In conclusion, we might observe that the only treaty for which there is evidence of a major 
impact on investment into Uganda is the Dutch one, but this effect has been to encourage 
treaty shopping rather than to stimulate significant amounts of Dutch investment. When 
private sector tax advisers were asked what would happen if the Dutch treaty were 
cancelled, they stated that investors would simply restructure, and were unlikely to withdraw 
their investments.  
 
2.4 Fiscal cooperation 
 
Tax treaties nowadays also may include provisions for cooperation between tax authorities in 
the form of information exchange and assistance in the collection of taxes. Broader 
arrangements for mutual assistance are also available through multilateral conventions. As 
Table 2 shows, however, Uganda’s bilateral treaty network is somewhat patchy in its 
provision of some of these benefits. 
 
Table 2 Fiscal cooperation provisions in Uganda's tax treaties 
 
Zambia UK 
South 
Africa 
Norway Denmark Italy Mauritius India 
Nether 
lands 
Belgium China 
Date of 
signature 
1968 1992 1997 1999 2000 2000 2003 2004 2004 2007 201225 
Information 
exchange 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Collection 
of taxes 
No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No 
 
Information exchange provisions allow a revenue authority from one country to obtain 
information about its taxpayers that the other country may hold – for example, if the other 
country is the home country of a multinational whose subsidiary the first country is auditing, 
or if an individual being investigated has savings in the other country. Revenue officials 
indicated that Uganda has historically made at the most ‘maybe one request per year’ using 
the powers in its tax treaties, 26 although this situation may be improving: between the URA’s 
Tax Investigations Department becoming the competent authority with powers to administer 
tax treaties in March 2014 and an interview conducted in June 2015, the URA had made 
                                                     
25  While IBFD (2014) states that this treaty was signed in 2012, MofPED officials claim it has not yet been signed. 
26  Interview with URA officials, Kampala, September 2014. 
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eight new requests for information (Kangave et al. 2016). Uganda is part of a pilot automatic 
tax information exchange project with the UK, but URA officials indicated that, even under 
this, they do not expect to gain much in the short- to medium-term. So while this might be an 
important tool to combat tax evasion in principle, in practice it is a tool from which Uganda is 
only just starting to benefit. 
 
There may be more benefit to Uganda from the legal basis created by modern treaties for the 
tax authority of one country to collect taxes on behalf of the other. A URA official explained 
that this could be important for the URA in cases such as the Zain capital gains dispute 
(discussed below), or in cases of short duration permanent establishments, where the 
taxpayer concerned no longer has any assets in Uganda by the time that an assessment is 
raised.27 It is unfortunate that many of Uganda’s treaties, including the potential one with 
China, do not include this provision. 
 
Having noted these advantages, it is important to realise that Uganda does not need bilateral 
tax treaties to obtain them. They can be obtained through two multilateral conventions. One, 
initiated by the African Tax Administration Forum (ATAF), covers African countries including 
Mauritius, but is not yet in force.28 The other, which is in force and which Uganda signed in 
November 2015, was initiated by the Council of Europe and the OECD, and covers all 
Uganda’s treaty partners.29 Multilateral conventions have further advantages. First, they 
provide for broad mutual assistance, and on a multilateral basis, which, for example, would 
permit joint assessment of a multinational by a consortium of tax authorities. This issue was 
thrown up as a result of a multi-country investigation conducted by the NGO ActionAid into 
the multinational brewery SABMiller, which owns Uganda’s main brewery, Nile (Hearson and 
Brooks 2010). The report provoked a desire in African tax authorities to conduct their own 
investigations, to combine forces and examine apparently similar tax avoidance practices 
across the continent. Unfortunately, they lacked the legal authority to do so, needing a single 
multilateral treaty covering all the relevant countries.30 
 
 
3  Problems with the content of Uganda’s 
existing treaties 
 
It would be unfair to say that Uganda has negotiated badly in the past. In fact, among sub-
Saharan countries its treaties are among the best when it comes to the protection of some 
taxation rights such as withholding taxes on management fees. However, this makes Uganda 
a good performer within a region that has systematically negotiated away large chunks of its 
taxing rights, especially in comparison with other regions (Dauer and Krever 2012). In this 
section we demonstrate that a lifting of these low expectations leads very quickly to a much 
more negative assessment of Uganda’s tax treaty network. 
 
It should be made clear that treaties are about taxing rights, not tax rates or even revenue. 
This means that the question to be asked when accepting a limitation in a treaty is not ‘How 
much tax should investors into Uganda pay?’, but ‘How much should Uganda constrain its 
right to levy tax now and in the future?’ The first is a question to be asked by reference to the 
current economic situation and economic policy. The second entails anticipating future 
events and priorities. In signing a treaty, a country accepts limitations on what future 
                                                     
27  Interview with URA officials, Kampala, September 2014. 
28  ATAF Multilateral Convention on Mutual Assistance. 
29  The Multilateral Convention on Mutual Assistance, formerly the OECD/Council of Europe Multilateral Convention on 
Mutual Assistance. Mauritius has recently signed but not yet ratified it. 
30  See ‘What happened next’ in 2012 update to Hearson and Brooks (2010). 
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governments, or even the same government in different economic circumstances, can do. 
The maximum withholding tax rates and other restrictions in treaties should be considered in 
this context of restricting future actions, rather than in terms of advisable tax policy in the 
current economic situation. 
 
3.1 Uganda’s treaty network is much less favourable than the UN model treaty 
 
MoFPED officials suggested to us that, in its negotiations, Uganda has generally followed the 
UN model tax convention, but sought to include an article permitting withholding taxes on 
management service fees.31 Most negotiating partners’ own opening positions are likely to 
have begun from the OECD model. Table 3 shows a selection of the results from these 
negotiations. The UN model is described in its title as a model for treaties ‘between 
developed and developing countries’, and is the most widely-recognised articulation of a 
good balance of taxing rights between developed and developing countries. Using it as an 
opening position has evidently not served Uganda well as a tool to achieve this eventual 
balance. 
 
Table 3 Selected provisions of Uganda's tax treaties 
Article 
of UN 
model Description Z
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 Year signed 1968 1992 1997 1999 2000 2000 2003 2004 2004 2007 2012
32 
5(3)(a) 
Construction PE 
(months) 
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
5(3)(a) 
Supervisory 
activities 
Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
5(3)(b) 
Service PE 
(months) 
No No No No 6 No 4 4 No No 6 
 
Oil exploration PE 
(days) 
NA NA NA NA NA 30 NA 30 NA NA NA 
7(1) 
(b&c) 
Limited force of 
attraction 
No No No No No No No No No No No 
10 
WHT on 
FDIidividend (%) 
0 15 10 10 15 10 10 0/15 10 5 7.5 
11 
WHT on interest 
(%) 
Sii 15 10 10 15 10 10 10 10 10 10 
12 
WHT on royalties 
(%) 
Sii 15 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
12a 
WHT on 
management 
feesiii 
No 15 10 10 10 10 10 No 10 10 No 
13(4) 
Capital gains – 
property rich 
NA No No No No No No No Yes No Yes 
13(5) 
Capital gains – 
other shares 
NA No No Yes No No No No Yes No No 
21(3) 
Source taxation of 
other income 
NA No Yes No No Yes No No No Yes No 
Notes: Items in red give Uganda fewer taxing rights than the UN model. 
I The Uganda-Zambia treaty gives exclusive source taxing rights over interest and royalties. 
ii Uganda’s tax code does not distinguish between FDI and portfolio dividends, but some of its treaties do. 
iii This provision is not currently part of the UN model, but is often included in sub-Saharan treaties. 
 
  
                                                     
31  Interview with Finance Ministry officials, Kampala, September 2014. 
32  While IBFD (2014) states that this treaty was signed in 2012, MofPED officials claim it has not yet been signed. 
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3.1.1 Withholding tax rates 
 
As noted earlier, tax treaties set maximum rates at which withholding taxes can be levied on 
cross-border payments, specifically dividends, interest, royalties and management or 
technical service fees. In Uganda’s tax code, these payments are all taxed at 15 per cent, but 
the treaty rates shown in Table 3 are mostly lower than this. Uganda has indeed been 
broadly successful at maintaining the right to levy a withholding tax on management fees 
paid to foreign companies, and the other withholding tax rates have historically compared 
well to those of many other African countries. However, these rates have trended down since 
its first treaty with the UK, in particular in the more recent treaties with the Netherlands, 
Belgium and China. It is worth noting the recent experience of Zambia, whose generous 
concessions to China appear to have created a precedent, pushing down withholding taxes 
quite significantly in a subsequent renegotiation with the UK (Hearson 2014). 
 
Uganda’s treaties generally set maximum rates that are below the rates in its domestic law. 
The treaty rates in Table 3 should be compared to the statutory 15 per cent rate levied on all 
these types of payments in Ugandan law. Table 4 gives an estimate of the revenue foregone 
as a result of the reduced dividend and interest withholding tax rates stipulated by tax 
treaties. It indicates that for these taxes the Dutch treaty may dwarf all others, with a cost of 
between 22 billion and 63 billion shillings per year (around US$8 million to US$24 million). 
Only the Mauritius treaty comes close, at 2.6 billion shillings (about US$1 million). These 
figures exclude the cost of lower withholding taxes on royalties and management fees, where 
data is not available, but which are likely to create significant further costs. ‘We realised that 
a lot of money was flying out through management fees’, a Finance Ministry official told us.33 
 
Table 4 Estimated revenue foregone due to reduced WHTs in treaties (Ugandan 
shillings, billion) 
 FDI stock in Uganda Estimated return on FDI WHT foregone 
Equity Debt Dividends Interest Dividends Interest 
Netherlands  9,899   525  414 22 21 to 62* 1.1 
Mauritius  1,012   229  42 9.6 2.1 0.5 
India  263   23  11 1.0 0.5 0.0 
South Africa  169   119  7.1 5.0 0.4 0.2 
Norway  77   1.9 3.2 0.1 0.2 0.0 
Denmark  9   30  0.4 1.3 0.0 0.1 
Source: IMF (2014). Assumes a uniform 4.1% return on FDI from Uganda based on <data.worldbank.org>. 
*Treaty rate is most likely 0%, but for some companies it may be 5% (for holdings below 50%) or 15% (for companies not 
composed of shares). 
 
3.1.2 The definition of permanent establishment 
 
Withholding tax rates are a first line of defence against tax avoidance, since they discourage 
abusive transfer pricing payments. Because they are levied on the gross value of payments, 
however, they can lead to onerous levels of taxation if margins are slim, unlike taxation of net 
profits; in the case of branches, which do not remit profits as dividends, profit taxation is 
necessary. Effective taxation of net profits in such circumstances depends on building a 
broad definition of permanent establishment, which sets the minimum threshold of activity 
before a company can have tax levied on its profits, into treaties. Many of Uganda’s treaties 
lack this. ‘Withholding tax rates are nothing’, a Finance Ministry official told us. ‘You can have 
high rates and then you’ve given out a lot in PEs’.34  
 
As an example of this debate, one particular concern for the MoFPED is the taxation of oil 
exploration activities. The treaties with the Netherlands and Denmark include a special oil 
                                                     
33  Interview with Finance Ministry official, Kampala, September 2014. 
34  Interview with Finance Ministry official, Kampala, September 2014. 
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exploration permanent establishment (PE) to tax the profits from such activities, the threshold 
for which is a minimum presence in the country of thirty days. Several tax advisers, however, 
felt that withholding taxes levied on the fees paid to specialist service providers in the oil 
industry would have been a more effective option, since it is easier for their oil industry 
clients to avoid being taxed as a PE. One said that Uganda should be asking, ‘What is it we 
can have a quick win on, which will not have so much complexity in terms of enforcement?’ 
He continued, ‘Oil service providers, for example, will always structure to avoid PE risk’.35 
 
A first weakness in the PE definitions within Uganda’s tax treaties is the absence from most 
of them of the UN service PE provision, which expands the PE threshold to encompass 
service providers who are physically present in the country but do not operate from a ‘fixed 
base’, otherwise the starting point of the PE definition. The UN service PE provision is 
contained in half of recent treaties signed by developing countries (Wijnen et al. 2012).36 
Furthermore, none of Uganda’s treaties include the less commonly used UN ‘limited force of 
attraction’ provision, which would allow inclusion of all a multinational’s profits from similar 
activities in Uganda within the profits of its permanent establishment. Both this and the 
service PE provision would expand the tax base of multinational enterprises operating in 
Uganda. 
 
Another weakness is in the length of time a construction site must be in place before it meets 
the PE definition. In common with around half the recent treaties signed by developing 
countries, Uganda has consistently obtained a six-month construction PE, which is more 
advantageous than the twelve months specified in the OECD model and the most common 
length in recent treaties signed by developing countries. But the six- and four-month 
thresholds in Uganda’s tax treaties may not be short enough in an era where, as one 
Finance Ministry official pointed out, ‘the Chinese can do things in three months’.37 
 
3.1.3 Capital gains 
 
Finally, the treaties’ capital gains provisions are problematic, because they restrict Uganda’s 
right to tax gains realised by foreign investors on sales of Uganda-based assets. First, only 
the India and China treaties include an anti-avoidance provision that would allow Uganda to 
tax sales of companies overseas that are vehicles for the ownership of immovable property 
in Uganda. This provision has been included even in the OECD model, and is found in 
almost two-thirds of recent treaties signed by developing countries. Its absence is at the 
heart of the Zain case (see below). Second, only Uganda’s treaties with India and Norway 
permit it to tax the sale of shares in a Ugandan company by foreign residents. This provision 
is also included in the UN model. Combined, these two omissions are a recipe for serial 
losses, discussed further below. 
 
3.2 There is evidence of significant revenue loss due to preventable treaty 
shopping 
 
Treaty shopping refers to the practice of establishing a conduit company in a country with a 
favourable network of tax treaties, and usually a low effective tax rate, to take advantage of 
the benefits of those treaties rather than the less generous terms (if there is a treaty at all) 
negotiated between the investor’s home country and the destination of their investment 
(Cooper 2014). As already noted, the vast majority of investment from the Netherlands into 
Uganda appears not to originate there. Given that it enables a zero rate on dividends, it is 
easy to see why.38 According to a URA official, ‘The ones claiming [reduced taxation] under 
                                                     
35  Interview with tax adviser, Kampala, September 2014. 
36  Further references to ‘recent treaties signed by developing countries’ are also taken from this study. 
37  Interview with Finance Ministry official, Kampala, September 2014. 
38  See also Kangave (2009). 
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the DTAs are many, about one per day. The worst culprits are Mauritius, Netherlands. There 
is a lot of treaty shopping. A lot of companies trading in Uganda have their HQs in 
Mauritius’.39 Consider Uganda’s booming mobile communications sector. Major investments 
come from countries that have a treaty with Uganda, but they have been structured via third 
countries with more favourable treaties. Bahti Airtel is headquartered in India, but its 
investment is structured via the Netherlands; MTN is headquartered in South Africa, with its 
investment structured via Mauritius (Kalinaki 2014; MTN Group Plc 2014). 
 
An important advantage to investors of Uganda’s treaties with the Netherlands and Mauritius 
is that they provide an easy treaty shopping route to avoid Ugandan capital gains tax. The 
treaties prevent Uganda from taxing the sale of shares in Ugandan companies by a Dutch or 
Mauritian resident, and may allow foreign investors to avoid capital gains tax on the sale of 
immovable property in Uganda simply by structuring the purchase through a vehicle in the 
Netherlands or Mauritius. The issue of ‘indirect transfers’ of capital assets has been 
highlighted by the United Nations (Cui 2014), IMF (2014a: 28) and OECD (2014b), the latter 
stating in its recent report to the G-20 development working group that: 
 
Developing countries report that the profit made by the owner of an asset 
when selling it (for example, the sale of a mineral licence) is often not taxed in 
the country in which the asset is situated. Artificial structures are being used in 
some cases to make an ‘indirect transfer’; for example through the sale of the 
shares in the company that owns the asset rather than the sale of the asset 
itself. 
 (OECD 2014b: 16) 
 
It is therefore concerning that, as Table 3 shows, so few of Uganda’s treaties include 
provisions concerning the taxation of gains from the alienation of shares, whether general 
shares or those in property-rich companies. The Dutch and Mauritian treaties present a 
particular problem here: with around 11 trillion Ugandan shillings (US$4 billion) of direct 
investment stocks in Uganda coming through these two countries (see Table 4), a potential 
billion dollars of capital gains tax is at risk that might otherwise be payable in Uganda. 40 
 
As one example, the URA is currently in dispute with Zain Telecom over $85 million of capital 
gains tax in exactly such an indirect transfer case. The sale of Celtel Uganda Ltd from Zain 
Telecom to Bahti Airtel took place via a network of holding companies in the Netherlands. 
The URA maintains that Celtel Uganda was a company consisting predominantly of 
immovable capital, and that as such it should be able to tax the transfer even though it took 
place in the Netherlands.41 Unfortunately, because the Uganda-Netherlands treaty does not 
contain a clause concerning property-rich companies, it allocates the right to tax this 
transaction to the Netherlands. When the case moves from technicalities to substance, the 
URA will no doubt point to section 88(5) of the Income Tax Act, an anti-treaty shopping 
provision which provides that: 
 
Where an international agreement provides that income derived from sources 
in Uganda is exempt from Ugandan tax or is subject to a reduction in the rate 
of Ugandan tax, the benefit of that exemption or reduction is not available to 
any person who, for the purposes of the agreement, is a resident of the other 
contracting state where 50 per cent or more of the underlying ownership of that 
person is held by an individual or individuals who are not residents of that 
other Contracting State for the purposes of the agreement. 
                                                     
39  Interview with URA official, Kampala, September 2014. 
40  The Uganda-Netherlands treaty does contain a provision that holds a Ugandan resident who becomes Dutch liable for 
Ugandan tax on capital gains for ten further years. 
41  Court of Appeal of Uganda, Commissioner General, URA versus Zain International BV, 2012. 
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There is a lot of uncertainty among tax professionals in both public and private sectors about 
whether an Income Tax Act such as this one can override the provisions of a tax treaty.42 
Section 88(2) of the Act gives treaties precedence over domestic law except for clause 88(5) 
and other anti-avoidance rules, but Uganda is also a signatory to the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties which may prevent ‘treaty overrides’ in domestic law. This case may 
provide some useful jurisprudence, but, absent a favourable court judgement, Uganda can 
only safeguard its taxing rights effectively by including anti-avoidance provisions within its 
treaties themselves. Furthermore, the ‘underlying ownership’ concept is relatively untested, 
and according to tax advisers there is an absence of procedural guidance from the URA 
explaining how taxpayers can demonstrate compliance. A concern mentioned by Ugandan 
tax advisers is the application of the underlying ownership concept to public limited 
companies, whose shareholders are numerous, geographically diverse, and constantly 
changing.43 
 
The OECD (2014a) is currently developing a general anti-abuse rule for inclusion in model 
treaties, based on a different form of anti-avoidance rule – a principle purpose test. Uganda 
would be well advised to follow this aspect of the OECD’s Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
(BEPS) project, and to consider incorporating a rule along these lines into its treaties (none 
currently contains an anti-abuse rule), as well as amending its domestic law to match. It may 
be able to do so through participating in the proposed multilateral instrument to introduce 
amendments into existing tax treaties. 
 
In any event, the Zain case could have been prevented without the need for a general abuse 
clause if Uganda had simply ensured that the specific anti-abuse rule relating to capital gains 
tax provided for by both the UN and OECD model treaties at article 13(4) was incorporated 
into its treaties, as it is in half of recent treaties signed by developing countries (Wijnen and 
de Goede 2013). The UN model contains a number of such specific anti-abuse rules, but 
their incorporation into Uganda’s treaties is patchy (Table 5). Some, such as the ‘beneficial 
owner’ and ‘special relationship’ wording in the UN and OECD model clauses on WHT are 
present in all Uganda’s treaties. However, several others are barely included, if at all. This 
includes the incorporation of a dependent agent maintaining stock in the definition of 
permanent establishment, and the limited force of attraction and capital gains provisions 
discussed earlier. 
 
Table 5 Examples of specific anti-abuse rules from the UN model in Uganda's tax 
treaties 
Article Description 
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 Year signed 1968 1992 1997 1999 2000 2000 2003 2004 2004 2007 201244 
5(5)(b) 
Dependent agent 
maintaining stock 
Yes No No No No No Yes No Yes No No 
7(1)(b&c) 
Limited force of 
attraction 
No No No No No No No No No No No 
13(4) 
Capital gains – 
property rich 
NA No No No No No No No Yes No Yes 
 
 
                                                     
42  Interviews with tax advisers and with URA officials, Kampala, September 2014. 
43  Interviews with tax advisers, Kampala, September 2014. 
44  While IBFD (2014) states that this treaty was signed in 2012, MofPED officials claim it has not yet been signed. 
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4  Problems with model treaties 
 
As noted earlier, Uganda may have opened its treaty negotiations with a preference for the 
UN model, but it rarely obtained UN model provisions for many articles. The UN model is a 
compromise position between developed and developing countries, developed by a group of 
tax officials nominated by both developed and developing countries: in other words, it is the 
outcome developing countries should aim for, not the opening position from which they 
should begin negotiations. There is a need for a model that fulfils this latter role. 
 
Precedent is powerful in treaty negotiations, and any changed approach to negotiations must 
bear this in mind, rather than plucking articles from nowhere. The best way to build 
precedent at this point is twofold: first, shape internationally-accepted models to reflect 
Uganda’s policy goals; second, negotiate strategically among like-minded countries to create 
precedent. Here we consider some examples. 
 
4.1 Uganda and the UN model 
 
Model tax treaties don’t stay static, they evolve. If Uganda is to adopt the UN model as its 
own negotiating model, it should be involved in shaping that model to reflect its own 
concerns. For example, the committee that updates the UN model treaty is currently 
considering the introduction into the treaty of a provision permitting withholding taxes on 
management service fees, which has always been a priority for Uganda in negotiations. The 
provision has been the subject of much disagreement among committee members.45 If it is 
adopted, this may help bolster Uganda’s position in negotiations, but a weaker version than 
that currently used by Uganda could have the opposite effect. 
 
There is no Ugandan member on the UN tax committee, and indeed there has not been 
since the committee was given its current status in 2005. It would still be possible to 
influence the UN’s work, for example by attending meetings as an observer: many observers 
make verbal contributions to committee meetings, where they have the benefit of speaking 
on behalf of their country, rather than in a personal capacity as committee members do. 
However, Uganda has not attended a UN committee session since 2004, nor does it appear 
to have submitted written comments to recent UN consultation exercises.46 Another 
possibility would be to coordinate with the actual UN committee members, for example those 
from Africa – of which there are five, from Ghana, Zambia, Senegal, South Africa and 
Morocco. Finance Ministry officials indicate that they do not take this opportunity either.47 
 
An important reason to engage with the work of the UN committee is the role its commentary 
may play in any treaty dispute arising from a clause based on the UN model. Unlike the 
OECD model (discussed below), countries cannot enter observations or reservations on the 
text or commentary; instead the commentary notes any difference of opinion between 
members concerning the treaty’s interpretation. If Uganda wishes the treaty to be interpreted 
in a particular way, it would need to ensure that the commentary reflects this, or else include 
an exchange of notes with each negotiated treaty to clarify its intentions. 
 
4.2 Uganda and the OECD model 
 
Uganda is a more frequent participant in the OECD’s annual tax treaties forum than at the 
UN. Unlike the UN committee session, however, this is not generally a meeting at which 
decisions are taken about the treaty model: that happens at meetings of Working Party 1 and 
                                                     
45  Observation at UN committee annual sessions, 2013 and 2014. 
46  Attendance lists on file with the authors. 
47  Interview with Finance Ministry officials, Kampala, September 2014. 
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the Committee on Fiscal Affairs, which Uganda is not entitled to attend. Non-members are, 
however, able to enter formal observations on the OECD model treaty and its commentary, 
and many developing countries do. Currently, Ivory Coast, Gabon and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo are the only sub-Saharan states to have entered observations on the 
OECD model (Vega and Rudyk 2011). 
 
Uganda has accepted OECD model clauses in many instances, but it has not entered any 
observations on the OECD model treaty. This means it may find itself bound in any treaty 
disputes by the interpretation of the treaty as articulated by OECD members. It also means 
that when negotiating partners bring the OECD model to the table, Uganda cannot point to 
an internationally-recognised articulation of its own response to that model. 
 
Perhaps more importantly, by not recording any observations Uganda contributes to a tacit 
acceptance of the OECD model provisions, rather than supporting an emerging developing 
country position in opposition to more residence-based provisions that would strengthen 
developing countries’ hands. For example, in 2010 the OECD made changes to article 7 of 
the model convention that substantially changed the balance of taxing rights from the 
operating countries of multinationals to their head office countries. Objections to this change 
were registered on behalf of Argentina, Azerbaijan, Brazil, Bulgaria, Colombia, Hong Kong, 
Indonesia, Latvia, Malaysia, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Singapore, South Africa and Thailand 
(OECD 2014c). This declared opposition is surely useful for developing countries wishing to 
prevent the inclusion of the new OECD provision in a treaty. 
 
4.3 Uganda and the EAC model 
 
In contrast to the OECD and UN models, Ugandan government officials indicated that they 
have participated actively in the formulation of the EAC model treaty for negotiations with 
third countries (Annex Table 4 shows a summary of the EAC treaty’s provisions). Uganda’s 
influence can be seen in the inclusion of a general limitation of benefits clause, which is 
similar to, but clearer than, that in Uganda’s own legislation. Another strength of the EAC 
model is the inclusion of a management fees article with a 10 per cent withholding tax. 
 
In other areas, the EAC model treaty would permit less taxation by Uganda of inward 
investment than one based on the UN model. It has a weaker definition of permanent 
establishment (e.g. delivery locations are excluded from the definition), and it lacks the UN 
paragraph 13(5) permitting source country taxation of capital gains from the sale of general 
shares. It also uses the weaker OECD definition of a property-rich company in paragraph 
13(4), which can be avoided through the use of a partnership or trust. 
 
In its quantitative articles, the EAC model makes the mistake of starting from a position that 
should be a final compromise, rather than the basis for opening negotiations. Perhaps most 
significantly, it begins with a six-month threshold for a permanent establishment for 
construction projects and services, despite an awareness in Uganda that many projects 
might fall below this threshold. It also specifies maximum withholding tax rates of 7.5 per cent 
on shares where the recipient owns more than 50 per cent of the company paying shares, 
well below the rate in most of Uganda’s treaties. Withholding taxes on interest and royalty 
payments are set at 15 per cent, the same as Uganda’s domestic law, but reduced to 10 per 
cent for related parties, a concession that surely should only be made, if at all, during 
negotiations in exchange for a benefit. The rate on management fees could also have been 
set at 15 per cent in the model. 
 
Finally, the EAC model includes a most favoured nation (MFN) clause in its withholding tax 
articles. This is in article 14: 
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If after the signature of this Agreement under any Convention or Agreement 
between a Contracting State and a third State, the Contracting State should 
limit its taxation at source on management or professional fees to a rate lower 
or a scope more restricted than the rate or scope provided for in this 
Agreement on the said items of income, then as from the date on which the 
relevant Contracting State Convention or Agreement enters into force the 
same rate or scope as provided for in that Convention or Agreement on the 
said items of income shall also apply under this Convention.  
 
An MFN clause can strengthen a country’s position in subsequent negotiations, because 
both sides appreciate the costs of agreeing to a lower rate. But, once triggered, those costs 
can be significant. A particular problem with this clause is that it is bilateral: in a treaty with a 
developed country, it could be triggered by that developed country concluding a subsequent 
agreement with lower withholding tax, even though any benefits from the resulting lower rate 
would overwhelmingly accrue to the developed country. 
 
Such an incident occurred with the April 2003 Venezuela-Spain treaty. In May 2006, the 
bilateral MFN clause in its interest article was triggered through a kind of domino effect: 
Estonia and The Netherlands signed a treaty granting exclusive source taxation rights over 
interest: this activated the MFN clause in the September 2003 Spain-Estonia treaty, which in 
turn activated the MFN clause in the Venezuela-Spain treaty. As a result, ‘Venezuela’s treaty 
with Spain has undoubtedly become the most favorable tax treaty executed by Venezuela to 
date’ (Escobar 2006). An MFN clause, just like a six-month PE definition, a 7.5 or 10 per cent 
WHT, and numerous smaller UN provisions that have not been carried across into the EAC 
model,48 should not be conceded in a model. It should be kept in reserve for treaty 
negotiations, only to be given up, if at all, in return for something else. 
 
4.4 Uganda and the COMESA model 
 
Documentation from the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) model 
treaty project indicates that Uganda was one of the few members of the group not to attend 
meetings at which this model was developed.49 In fact, it appears that URA officials did 
participate in the project at some point, but not the Ministry of Finance.50 Like the EAC 
model, the COMESA model has some strengths in comparison to the UN model, but its 
protection of source taxing rights is weaker than both the EAC and UN models. For example, 
its PE definition omits both delivery units and dependent agents maintaining stock; it also 
follows the less-expansive OECD definition of royalties. The model does not specify 
withholding tax rates, which may be preferable to the compromise rates specified in the EAC 
model, but is less beneficial than higher rates would be. Unlike the EAC model, it does not 
include an article on technical service fees. 
 
There are two main advantages to the COMESA model. The first is the inclusion of anti-
treaty shopping provisions. Main purpose tests, which disqualify taxpayers from the lower 
rates if the main purpose of the transaction is to benefit from those lower rates, are included 
in some of the withholding tax articles, to complement the ‘beneficial owner’ and ‘special 
relationship’ anti-avoidance provisions.51 Second, member states can also enter 
reservations, which would allow Uganda to open its negotiations from a stronger position 
than that in the COMESA model itself. Uganda has already entered some reservations, 
                                                     
48  For example: source taxation of shipping in article 8 of the UN model, which is probably less interesting for a landlocked 
country; inclusion of payments for the use of equipment within the definition of royalties; taxation of senior managers in 
article 16 of the UN model. 
49  COMESA project documents, on file with the authors. 
50  Interviews with URA and Finance Ministry officials, Kampala, September 2014. 
51  Notably, Mauritius has entered a reservation on these articles. 
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including one indicating that it prefers to include an article allowing it to impose a withholding 
tax on management fees. 
 
4.5 Uganda needs an ambitious new model treaty 
 
There is no current model treaty that it would be advisable for Uganda to use as an opening 
position in negotiations. It is not satisfactory to rely on any one of these models. Instead, 
Uganda should develop its own model, taking into account its domestic law, and cherry 
picking from the best of its existing treaties and from the EAC, COMESA, UN and OECD 
models. Provisions that seem of little importance to Uganda, such as on shipping, should be 
included, but could be given up as part of horse-trading during negotiations. Uganda should 
enter reservations on important provisions at COMESA and the OECD, and ensure that 
commentaries to the EAC and UN model reflect its views. 
 
A Ugandan model could include, for example: 
 
1. All elements of the UN model PE definition, with a 90-day or lower period for construction 
sites and service PEs, as provided in Ugandan law. 
2. 15 per cent WHT rates across the board, including on technical service fees, as in 
Uganda’s treaty with the UK and its domestic legislation, with main purpose tests for 
passive income as in the COMESA model. 
3. All capital gains provisions from the UN model. 
4. The Limitation of Benefits or Principal Purpose clause from the EAC model or the 
forthcoming new OECD provision. 
5. Exchange of information and collection of taxes provisions from the UN and EAC models. 
 
 
5  A holistic approach to tax treaty policy 
 
Tax treaties do not operate in a vacuum. They are part of a network of foreign investment 
instruments intended to ensure that the interests of investors are protected. Like treaties, 
these other instruments sometimes also result in revenue loss because they restrict the host 
country’s ability to tax. For this reason, any review of a country’s tax treaty policy should 
involve an analysis of these additional layers of investment protection. Two examples of such 
instruments are foreign investment contracts (such as production sharing agreements and 
power purchasing agreements), and other international investment agreements (including 
bilateral investment treaties). Similarly, a review of Uganda’s tax treaty policy needs to pay 
close attention to some of the shortcomings in its domestic legislation, as the latter is in effect 
the starting point for negotiations.  
  
5.1 Treaty gains may be eroded by tax incentives contained in foreign 
investment contracts, such as production sharing agreements  
 
There is no direct relationship between tax treaties and production sharing agreements 
(PSAs). However, the latter also often contain provisions on taxation, which sometimes result 
in loss of tax revenue. For example, in Tullow Uganda Limited and Tullow Operational 
Property Ltd. v Uganda Revenue Authority TAT Application No. 4 of 2011, one of the issues 
was whether Tullow could rely on an exemption from tax that was contained in the PSA 
signed between the company and the Minister for Energy, on behalf of the Government of 
Uganda. Article 23.5 of the agreement read inter alia: 
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The assignment or transfer of an interest under this Agreement and any 
related Exploration or Production License shall not be subject to any tax, fee, 
or other impost or fee levied on the assignor or assignee in respect thereof.  
 
The Tax Appeals Tribunal agreed that the wording of Article 23.5 was such that it provided 
an exemption to the company from all taxes, including capital gains tax. However, it held that 
the Minister of Energy did not have the legal authority to grant tax exemptions, since article 
152 of the Uganda Constitution requires tax exemptions to be reported to parliament. In the 
earlier case of Heritage Oil & Gas Limited v Uganda Revenue Authority Civil Appeal No. 14 
of 2011, Heritage contested the capital gains tax that the URA had assessed on it for the 
transfer of its petroleum licence to Tullow. Again in this case, the court held that the Income 
Tax Act required that the company pay capital gains tax on the transaction. The combined 
tax revenue from these two assessments totalled some $900 million. These cases illustrate 
the undesirability for tax issues to be included in negotiations with foreign investors by 
ministries responsible for attracting foreign investment. 
 
While the URA was successful in taxing capital gains in the above two instances, this has not 
always been the case. Parliamentary records indicate that previous licence transfers from 
Neptune Petroleum to Tower Resources, and three transfers by Hardman Resources and 
Energy Africa to Tullow Oil were made without attracting taxes.52 Part of URA’s success in 
the Tullow and Heritage cases may thus be attributed to heated debates in parliament in 
2011, where MPs complained about the failure of government to tax capital gains in previous 
licence transfers.53  
 
In addition to the tax-specific exemptions contained in PSAs, such as that concluded 
between Tullow and the Government of Uganda, PSAs often contain stabilisation clauses 
which have the effect of freezing domestic laws in as far as those laws apply to the 
transactions of the investor in question. Similarly, these agreements may contain economic 
equilibrium clauses which too frequently demand (prohibitive) compensation in the event of a 
government making legal changes that negatively impact on an investor’s economic 
standing. It has been reported, for example, that the PSA concluded between the 
Government of Uganda and Heritage Oil & Gas Limited had a clause to the effect that, ‘if 
there is any change, or series of changes, in the laws or regulations of Uganda which 
materially reduces the economic benefits of the company, the government must make 
substantial economic compensation’ (Haywood 2010). The 1970s and 1980s witnessed 
numerous debates on the legality of stabilisation and economic equilibrium clauses. 
However, it appears to be now widely accepted in international law that these clauses are 
legally binding (Cotula 2007). 
 
That Uganda’s jurisprudence so far on PSAs and taxation has favoured the taxation of 
capital gains and reinforced the sovereignty of the state in as far as tax issues are concerned 
is a good precedent. However, these agreements have raised a red flag on the potential 
dangers in negotiation of foreign investment contracts. 
 
5.2 Interaction between BITs and the loss of domestic tax revenue  
 
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), while not specific to taxation, may contain provisions 
that have a bearing on a country’s ability to tax. Uganda has signed fifteen BITs, but only 
seven of these are in force (UNCTAD 2015). Of particular interest for our purposes is the BIT 
that Uganda concluded with the Netherlands, which came into force in January 2003. Article 
4 thereof explicitly includes taxation matters within the treaty’s effects: 
 
                                                     
52  The Republic of Uganda, Official Report of Debates of Parliament (Hansard) 9th Parliament (10 October 2011) at 22-25.  
53  Ibid.  
  
 
25 
With respect to taxes, fees, charges and to fiscal deductions and exemptions, each 
Contracting Party shall accord to investors of the other Contracting Party who are 
engaged in any economic activity in its territory, treatment not less favourable than 
that accorded to its own investors or to those of any third State who are in the same 
circumstances, whichever is more favourable to the investors concerned. For this 
purpose, however, there shall not be taken into account any special fiscal 
advantages accorded by that Party: 
(a) under an agreement for the avoidance of double taxation; or 
(b) by virtue of its participation in a customs union, economic union or similar 
institution; or 
(c) on the basis of reciprocity with a third State. 
 
It is noteworthy that this provision expressly excludes the application of the ‘national 
treatment’ and MFN clause to tax treaties. Even then, it still requires that investors from the 
Netherlands benefit from the most favourable tax clauses (including deductions and 
exemptions) that are accorded to any other group of investors under other arrangements that 
Uganda may enter into. We have already pointed out the risks associated with MFN clauses 
in Section 4.3. While other BITs in force in Uganda contain national and MFN treatment 
clauses, those agreements differ from the Dutch treaty in that they expressly provide that the 
clause does not apply to tax matters. Some of the BITs that Uganda has signed have 
expressly stated that the agreements will not apply to tax matters. For example, the 
agreement with China, while not yet in force, expressly provides in Article 3 that ‘the 
Agreement shall not apply to matters of taxation in the territory of either Contracting Party’. 
The advantage with such a provision is that it ensures that general issues dealing with 
investment are handled by the Ministry of Trade and Industry, while the more specific and 
technical issues of taxation are handled by the MoFPED.  
 
The Uganda-Netherlands BIT, coupled with the DTA signed between the two countries, 
creates more opportunities for reducing Uganda’s taxing rights. This is made worse by the 
fact that the BIT is to remain effective for an initial period of fifteen years, meaning Uganda 
cannot exercise the option to terminate until six months before the expiry date (2018). If the 
agreement is not terminated at this point, the next opportunity for either contracting state to 
terminate the agreement will not be until 2028.  
 
BITs pose another risk to taxation. They commonly include provisions allowing foreign 
investors recourse to external arbitration, which may result in the award of huge monetary 
compensation. It has been observed elsewhere, for example, that in the famous dispute 
between Vodafone International Holdings BV (the company) and the Government of India, 
the company opted to use the dispute resolution mechanism under a BIT instead of seeking 
to invoke the mutual agreement procedures in the DTA (Choudhury and Owens 2014).  
 
5.3 In some places, Uganda’s domestic law is weaker than international model 
treaties and existing tax treaties 
 
There are instances where the Income Tax Act is weaker than international model treaties 
generally, and the tax treaties concluded by Uganda in particular. The first disadvantage of 
this is that if domestic laws play some role in guiding treaty negotiations – and we assume 
that they play at least some role – then a weak domestic law puts Uganda in a poor 
bargaining position from the onset. A second concern is that, as tax treaties cannot create a 
tax obligation where none exists in domestic law, there is little point in Uganda negotiating a 
better deal unless its own laws are revised. Such weaknesses include, for example, the 
definition of a Permanent Establishment (PE). As we noted earlier, withholding taxes may 
often be preferable to taxing net profits of a permanent establishment, but Uganda’s tax 
policy officials also believe that obtaining a low PE threshold in their treaties is important to 
ensure that they can tax foreign companies operating in Uganda fairly. 
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But Uganda’s domestic law is closely based on tax treaty definitions of permanent 
establishment. Uganda’s Income Tax (Transfer Pricing) Regulations, 2011, define a branch, 
a taxable entity, to mean: 
 
a)  a permanent establishment, in the case of a treaty signed between Uganda and 
another country; or 
b)  the definition found in Section 78 of the Income Tax Act. 
 
Section 78 defines a branch to mean ‘a place where a person carries on business,’ and 
includes –  
 
(i)  a place where a person is carrying on business through an agent, other than a 
general agent of independent status acting in the ordinary course of business as 
such; 
(ii)  a place where a person has, is using or is installing substantial equipment or 
substantial machinery for ninety days or more; or 
(iii)  a place where a person is engaged in a construction, assembly, or installation 
project for ninety days or more, including a place where a person is conducting 
supervisory activities in relation to such a project;’ 
 
This domestic definition appears to be based on the PE concept in model tax treaties, but 
compared with the laundry list that the model treaties on what constitutes a PE, Uganda’s 
domestic definition is actually much narrower. While its statutory definition of a branch 
provides for a shorter period (90 days) for when an establishment can be assessed on its 
business income than the PE concept in the UN model and most of its own treaties (6 
months/183 days) and the OECD (365 days), the fact that many other structures and 
activities that might fall under the purview of the treaty definition are excluded leaves a lot to 
be desired. An argument could be made that these other activities would in any event be 
covered under Section 79 (s) of the Income Tax Act, which is to the effect that income is 
deemed to be sourced in Uganda if it is ‘attributable to any other activity which occurs in 
Uganda, including an activity conducted through a branch in Uganda’. However, the fact that 
the sub-section refers to a branch leads us back to the three categories of branch identified 
under Section 78. Possibly the most effective way to safeguard Uganda’s taxing rights would 
be to leave the domestic law definition of branch wide in scope, rather than modelling it on 
the tax treaty permanent establishment provision at all. 
 
 
6  Conclusion and recommendations 
 
None of the reasons articulated by the government of Uganda in the past or present for 
concluding tax treaties seem to hold up in the current context. Provisions for tax sparing are 
largely unnecessary and possibly undesirable. Double tax relief can be obtained 
unilaterally.54 Mutual assistance, clearly a priority for the URA, is not always delivered by 
Uganda’s current treaties, and in any event would be more comprehensive and effective 
when obtained through multilateral agreements. 
 
Meanwhile, none of Uganda’s treaties meet the standards set out in the UN model. At 
present there is a major problem in the form of treaty shopping through the Dutch treaty, 
which should be the top priority for renegotiation. However, renegotiating priorities should not 
stop at treaty shopping. The weak permanent establishment provisions in Uganda’s treaties 
                                                     
54  A possible exception to this is within the EAC, where the absence of double taxation relief may be a hindrance for 
Kenyan investors until the new EAC multilateral tax treaty is ratified. 
  
 
27 
mean there is a pool of inward investment of indeterminate size that Uganda cannot currently 
tax. Perhaps more significant is the major lack of source taxing rights over capital gains 
made by inward investors. The high-profile Zain and Heritage court cases indicate that 
Uganda wishes to tax capital gains when business interests in Uganda are sold on by 
overseas investors, but Uganda’s treaties are not fit for this purpose. 
 
Re-evaluating its current treaties against existing standards may not be enough, however. If 
Uganda decides that tax treaties are desirable, it needs a stronger model than those 
currently available to it. This should present a best-possible scenario, so that the eventual 
outcome of negotiations is closer to the reasonable compromise position embodied by the 
UN model. The EAC and COMESA models contain some ambitious elements, but overall 
they are no stronger as opening positions than the UN model. Uganda also needs more 
robust domestic laws to bolster its negotiating position and ensure that it can interpret its 
treaties expansively, and to ensure that other investment promotion instruments do not 
further weaken its taxing rights. 
 
Furthermore, Uganda should ask itself not just, ‘Why sign new treaties?’ and ‘How should 
existing treaties be renegotiated?’, but also ‘Why keep existing treaties?’ Path dependence 
may well be an important answer. Investor surveys do reveal that Uganda’s stable political 
and economic regime is one of its most important assets in attracting investment (Uganda 
Bureau of Statistics 2012). There may therefore be concern that cancelling tax treaties might 
create what a tax adviser described as negative PR. Alternatively, a reputation for stability 
may cushion Uganda against fears that treaty cancellations are a prelude to a dramatic shift 
towards discriminatory or unfair taxation. 
 
A suggested course of action for Uganda’s review could include the following steps: 
 
1. Identify the areas where tax treaties and domestic legislation leave it most vulnerable to 
revenue loss. This includes PE definition (treaty and domestic), treaty shopping (treaty 
and domestic), withholding taxes (treaty) and capital gains (treaty and PSAs). 
2. Incorporate an assessment of tax foregone due to tax treaties into the government’s 
annual statement of tax expenditure. 
3. Formulate an ambitious Ugandan model by applying a ‘best available’ approach to 
existing models (EAC, COMESA, UN), current treaties and domestic legislation, none of 
which are currently adequate. This might include: 
a. All elements of the UN model PE definition, with a 90-day period for construction sites 
and service PEs as per Ugandan law. 
b. 15 per cent withholding tax rates across the board, including on technical service 
fees, as per Uganda’s treaty with the UK and its domestic legislation, with main 
purpose tests for passive income as per the COMESA model. 
c. All capital gains provisions from the UN model. 
d. The Limitation of Benefits clause from the EAC model or the forthcoming new OECD 
provision. 
e. Exchange of information and collection of taxes provisions from the UN and EAC 
models. 
4. Identify red lines within the Ugandan model. This should certainly include items c, d and e 
from the above list. 
5. Based on investment and remittance data, request renegotiation of treaties that have the 
greatest actual (or potential in terms of capital gains) cost. At first sight, this appears to 
be the treaties with the Netherlands, Mauritius, UK and China. These renegotiations 
should be conducted on the basis of an improved distribution of taxing rights in Uganda’s 
favour, not a balanced negotiation. 
6. Cancel these high-impact treaties if the red lines cannot be obtained. 
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7. Ensure that future updates to provisions of model treaties that Uganda uses, or to their 
commentaries and reservations/observations, reflect the positions set out in this new 
Ugandan model. 
8. As part of this review, ensure consistency between tax treaty objectives and the Income 
Tax Act, tax incentives, foreign investment contracts and Bilateral Investment Treaties. 
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Annex: Additional tables 
 
Annex Table 1 Some recent tax treaty cancellations 
Terminating 
country 
Partner country Year 
terminated 
Reason given 
Germany Brazil 2005 Non-standard transfer pricing rules in Brazil; new Brazilian taxes 
not included; no need for matching credits (Haddad et al. 2005). 
Indonesia Mauritius 2006 ‘There was an abuse that was inflicting a loss upon Indonesia’ (SG 
Financial Services n.d.). 
Argentina Austria 2008 Suggested to be due to treaty shopping (Sovereign Group 2008). 
Rwanda Mauritius 2012 Appears to have been part of renegotiation strategy 
Mongolia Luxembourg 2012 Treaty shopping by mining companies; slow response to request to 
renegotiate (Government of Mongolia 2012) 
Mongolia Netherlands 2012 Treaty shopping by mining companies; refusal to meet 
renegotiation terms (Government of Mongolia 2012) 
Argentina Chile 2012  
Argentina Spain 2012 Appears to have been part of renegotiation strategy 
Argentina Switzerland 2012 Appears to have been part of renegotiation strategy 
Malawi Netherlands 2013 Appears to have been part of renegotiation strategy 
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Annex Table 2 Comparison of Uganda's tax treaties against the UN and OECD model 
treaties 
Article Description U
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 Year signed 1992 1997 1999 2000 2000 2003 2004 2004 2007 2012
55 
5(3)(a) 
Construction PE 
(months) 
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
5(3)(a) Supervisory activities O U U O U U U U U U 
5(3)(b) Service PE (months) O O O 6 O 4 4 O O 6 
5(4)(a) PE exclusion - delivery O U U U O U U O U U 
5(4)(b) 
PE exclusion – 
delivery 
O U U U O U U U U U 
5(5)(b) 
Dependent agent – 
stock 
O O O O O U O U O O 
5(6) Insurance PE O O O O O O O U U O 
 Oil exploration PE NA NA NA NA 30 NA 30 NA NA NA 
7(1) 
(b&c) 
Limited force of 
attraction 
O O O O O O O O O O 
7(3) 
Deductions 
clarification 
O U U U U U U O U O 
8(2) 
Shipping and air 
transport 
O O O O O O O O O O 
9(3) Deductions - penalty  O O O U U U U O U O 
10 
WHT on FDI dividend 
(%) 
15 10 10 15 10 10 0/15 10 5 7.5 
10 FDI threshold (%) NA 25 25 NA 25 NA 50 NA 10 NA 
10 
WHT on portfolio 
dividend (%) 
15 15 15 15 15 10 5/15 10 15 7.5 
11 WHT on interest (%) 15 10 10 15 10 10 10 10 10 10 
12 WHT on royalties (%) 15 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
12 Royalty definition – TV U U U U O U O U U U 
12 
Royalty definition – 
equipment 
U O O U U U O U O U 
12a 
WHT on management 
fees (%) 
15 10 10 10 10 10 NA 10 10 NA 
13(4) 
Capital gains – 
property rich 
O- O- O- O- O- O- O- O O- O 
13(5) 
Capital gains – other 
shares 
O O U O O O O U O O 
16 
Director’s fees – 
include senior 
managers 
O O O O O O O O U O 
18 
Pensions – shared 
taxing right 
O O O O U+ O U+ O U+ O 
18 
Pensions – social 
security 
O O O O U O U O U U 
21(3) Other income O U O O U O O O U O 
26 Information exchange Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
27 Collection of taxes No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No 
O: OECD provision 
U: UN provision 
U+: more generous UN provision where there is an option.
                                                     
55  While IBFD (2014) states that this treaty was signed in 2012, MofPED officials claim it has not yet been signed. 
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Annex Table 3 Selected provisions of sub-Saharan Africa countries' treaties with 
China, Mauritius and the Netherlands (all figures %) 
China Nigeria Ethiopia Zambia Botswana Uganda 
  2002 2009 2010 2012   
Construction PE 6 6 9 12 6 
Supervisory activities Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Services PE No No 6 6 6 
Dividends 7.5 5 5 5 7.5 
Interest 7.5 7 10 7.5 10 
Royalties 7.5 5 5 5 10 
Mgmt fees Exempt Exempt Exempt Exempt Exempt 
CGT Property rich No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CGT shares No No No No No 
 
Mauritius 
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  1992 1994 1994 1995 1995 1997 1997 2002 2003 2011 2012 2013 
Construction 
PE 
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 9 6 9 12 6 
Supervisory 
activities 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Services PE No No 6 6 6 6 6 9 4 No 6 6 
Dividends 10 5 7.5 5 5 10 8 Exempt 10 5 5 10 
Interest 10 10 5 12 10 10 8 Exempt 10 10 10 10 
Royalties 15 5 7.5 12.5 5 10 5 Exempt 10 5 10 10 
Mgmt fees Exempt Exempt Exempt Exempt Exempt Exempt Exempt Exempt 10 Exempt Exempt 12 
CGT Property 
rich 
Yes No No No No Yes* No No No NA No No 
CGT shares No No No No No No No No No NA No No 
 
Netherlands Zambia Zimbabwe Nigeria Uganda Ghana Ethiopia 
  1977 1989 1991 2004 2008 2012 
Construction PE 6 6 3 6 9 6 
Supervisory activities Yes No Yes Yes Yes No 
Services PE No No 3 4 No No 
Dividends 5 10 12.5 0/15 5 5 
Interest 10 10 12.5 10 8 5 
Royalties 10 10 12.5 10 8 5 
Mgmt fees Exempt Exempt Exempt Exempt 8 Exempt 
CGT Property rich No No No No Yes^ Yes* 
CGT shares No Yes No No No No 
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Annex Table 4 Comparison of provisions in EAC and COMESA model treaties (all 
figures %) 
Red indicates provision is worse (less source-based) than the UN model 
Green indicates provision is better than the UN model 
UN model 
reference Provision EAC COMESA 
5(3)(a) Construction PE (months) 6 Unspecified 
5(3)(a) Supervisory activities Yes Yes 
5(3)(b) Service PE (months) 6 Unspecified 
5(4)(a) PE exclusion - delivery excluded Yes Yes 
5(4)(b) PE exclusion – delivery excluded Yes Yes 
5(5)(b) Dependent agent – stock included Yes No 
5(6) Insurance PE Yes Yes 
7(1)(b&c) Limited force of attraction Yes No 
7(3) Deductions clarification Yes Yes 
8(2) Shipping and air transport No No 
9(3) Deductions – penalty Yes No 
10 WHT on FDI dividend (%) 7.5 Unspecified 
10 FDI threshold (%) 50 Unspecified 
10 WHT on portfolio dividend (%) 15 Unspecified 
11 WHT on interest (%) 10 OR 15 Unspecified^ 
12 WHT on royalties (%) 10 OR 15 Unspecified^ 
12 Royalty definition – TV Yes No 
12 Royalty definition – equipment No No 
12a WHT on management fees 10 No* 
13(4) Capital gains – property rich No No 
13(5) Capital gains – other shares No No 
16 Director’s fees – include senior managers No No 
18 Pensions – shared taxing right Yes Yes 
18 Pensions – social security Yes Yes 
21(3) Other income Yes Yes 
 
General limitation of benefits Yes No 
26 Exchange of information Yes Yes 
27 Collection of taxes Yes Yes 
^ Includes main purpose test. 
* Burundi, Malawi, Rwanda, Swaziland, Uganda and Zambia reserve the right to include a separate article concerning technical 
service fees, similar to article 12. 
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